Mansour, W., Ben Abdelhamid, M. and Heshmati, A. (2015), “Recursive profit and loss sharing”,” The Journal of Risk, Vol. 17 no. 6, pp. 21-50. A two-tier variant of mudarabah, which has caused some complaints, is a variant that replaces profit and loss sharing between the depositor and the bank with a profitable split – losses are the whole problem of depositors. Instead of the bank and its depositors owning the capital (rabb al-mal) and the entrepreneurs of Mudarib, the bank and the entrepreneur are now the two Mudarib, and if they are lost after the execution of the overhead and operating costs, they are passed on to the depositors. One critic (Ibrahim Warde) called this “Hazard Islamic morality,” where banks are able to “privatize profits and socialize losses.” [18] [19] PROFIT SHARING. In return for the tasks performed under this Agreement, the representative shall be entitled to [percentage] of the profits made for the sale of the product, which are the direct result of the representative`s efforts. Profit and loss sharing is one of the “two core categories” of Islamic financing[2], the other being “debt-based contracts” (or “debt-type instruments”)[5], such as Murabaha, Istisna`a, Salam and Leasing, which include “the purchase and lease of fixed-yield goods or services”. [2] While early proponents of the Islamic banking system (such as Mohammad Najatuallah Siddiqui) hoped that PLS would be the main mode of Islamic financing, the use of fixed-yield financing now far exceeds that of PLS in the Islamic financing industry. [6] [7] The investor/partner receives a prorated share of the profits.
In accordance with the above-mentioned studies, Nabi (2012) studied the impact of PLS contracts on the evolution of income inequality with the process of capital accumulation, based on the study by Aghion and Bolton (1997). He studied the problem of asset inequality between two investors with different asset classes. He found that asset inequality between the two categories of investors decreases over time, proving that the profit-benefit contract shifts the dynamics of assets towards income inequality. This evidence indicates that entrepreneurship allows the latter to catch up with the initial asset class, which is consistent with the study by Maghrebi and Mirakhor (2015). Figures 1 and 2 show the optimal values of the Musharakah contract safety index when the shock is low and high after taking into account the brand movements and the audit factor. The first diagrams in Figures 1 and 2 show the optimal values of the parameters in terms of mark impressions, profit share and examination factor. We find that the simulated values of the parameters α and A for the three contracts were changed when we went from low to high shock. Indeed, the brand returns and audit parameters are respectively 0.2 and 0.3 in the event of a low shock, respectively 0.7 and 0.5 in the event of a high shock. This indicates that in a riskier environment, i.e. when switching from low to high shock, the severity of the marks tends to increase and the examination becomes more expensive.. .
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